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MERGING OFFENSIVE-SPEECH CASES WITH
VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES: THE
IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF MATAL v. TAM ON TWO STRANDS
OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Clay Calvert*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines flaws with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Matal
v. Tam that equated giving offense with viewpoint discrimination. Already, the
Court’s language in Tam that “giving offense is a viewpoint” is being cited by multiple
lower courts. This Article argues, however, that giving offense is not synonymous
with viewpoint discrimination. This Article contends that the Court in Tam conflated
two distinct strands of First Amendment jurisprudence—namely, its offensive-speech
cases with principles against viewpoint discrimination. The Article proposes two
possible paths forward to help courts better clarify when a case such as Tam should
be analyzed as an offensive-speech case and when it should be treated as a case in-
volving viewpoint-based discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
In September 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
in American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County1 that banning disparaging
advertisements on public buses violates the First Amendment’s freedom of speech.2
* Professor, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication, and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville,
Florida. Bachelor of Arts in Communication, 1987, Stanford University; Juris Doctor (Order
of the Coif), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1991; Doctor of Philosophy,
Communication, Stanford University, 1996. The Author thanks University of Florida students
Jessie Goodman and Emerson Tyler for reviewing and critiquing drafts of this Article.
1 No. 17-35897, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27581, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2018).
2 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties that apply
to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (holding that freedom of speech and of the press are “fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). See Am. Freedom
Def. Initiative, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27581, at *15 (“In sum, Metro’s disparagement clause
discriminates, on its face, on the basis of viewpoint. The disparagement clause therefore can-
not serve as a constitutionally valid basis for rejecting Plaintiffs’ revised ad.”).
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The court reasoned that, although ad space on buses was a nonpublic forum,3 the
prohibition against disparaging ads—enforced by King County, Washington’s Metro
Transit agency—discriminated based on viewpoint.4 That conclusion was the ordi-
nance’s death knell.
First Amendment jurisprudence, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg crisply ex-
plained in 2014, “disfavors viewpoint-based discrimination[,]”5 including in nonpublic
fora.6 Indeed, “[t]he first rule of free speech theory and doctrine is that the government
may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint based simply on its disagree-
ment with that viewpoint.”7 The Ninth Circuit applied this principle in American
Freedom Defense Initiative. It specifically resolved—and critically so, for purposes
of this Article—that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint, so Metro’s disparagement clause
discriminates, on its face, on the basis of viewpoint.”8
The lynchpin for the Ninth Circuit’s logic that giving offense is a viewpoint was
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling in the trademark-registration case of Matal
v. Tam.9 The Court in Tam declared the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act,10
which “governs federal trademark law unconstitutional.”11 That clause gave the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the power to deny registration for marks that
“may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institu-
tions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”12 The
USPTO in Tam had invoked this clause to deny a band’s application to register its
name, “The Slants,” because it disparaged Asians.13
3 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27581,  at *7.
4 Id. at *10.
5 Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 748 (2014).
6 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (noting that the Court “em-
ploys a distinct standard of review to assess speech restrictions in nonpublic forums” and
adding that under this standard, expression cannot be suppressed “merely because public offi-
cials oppose the speaker’s view” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (emphasis added))); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1204 (5th ed. 2015) (“The government may prohibit or restrict
speech in nonpublic forums so long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”
(emphasis added)).
7 Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695,
703 (2011).
8 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *11.
9 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1051, 1052(a) (2012). The Lanham Act is “the foundation of trademark law
today.” Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1687 (1999).
11 Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam—A Victory for The Slants, a Touchdown for the Redskins,
But an Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 83, 90 (2018).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
13 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
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In striking down the disparagement clause in Tam, Justice Alito reasoned for a
bloc of four justices that the clause “discriminates on the bases of ‘viewpoint’” be-
cause “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”14 For Justice Alito, this comported with the
notion that the Court uses “the term ‘viewpoint’ discrimination in a broad sense.”15
Penning a concurrence joined by three other justices, Justice Kennedy also found
that the disparagement clause was viewpoint based, but he more precisely attempted
to define when viewpoint discrimination exists.16 He wrote that the “test for viewpoint
discrimination is whether—within the relevant subject category—the government
has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”17
Applying this rule to the facts of Tam, Justice Kennedy elaborated that:
[T]he disparagement clause the Government now seeks to imple-
ment and enforce identifies the relevant subject as “persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a). Within that category, an applicant may register a posi-
tive or benign mark but not a derogatory one. The law thus re-
flects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it
finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.18
Significantly, American Freedom Defense Initiative is not the only federal-
appellate-court ruling since Tam was handed down in June 2017 to equate giving
offense with viewpoint discrimination. In January 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito19 held that the New York State
Office of General Services engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when
it prevented the “Wandering Dago” food truck from participating in a lunch program,20
because that name, along with the names of items sold from the truck, constituted eth-
nic slurs.21 Citing Tam, the Second Circuit concluded that “the mere use of these po-
tentially offensive words in the factual setting presented here reflects a viewpoint.”22
14 Id. at 1763.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at 1765.
17 Id. at 1766.
18 Id.
19 879 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2018).
20 Id. at 33.
21 See id. at 28 (stating that proposed menu items to be sold by the Wandering Dago truck
included ones named “‘Dago,’ ‘Castro,’ ‘American Idiot,’ ‘Goombah,’ ‘Guido,’ ‘Polack,’ ‘El
Guapo,’ and ‘KaSchloppas’”); id. at 30–33; see also Jessica Barbata Jackson, Before the Lynch-
ing: Reconsidering the Experience of Italians and Sicilians in Louisiana, 1870s–1890s, 58
LA. HIST. 300, 305 n.15 (2017) (“The pejorative epithet ‘dago’ was commonly used in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to refer to Italians.”).
22 Wandering Dago, 879 F.3d at 33.
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Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Susan Carney added that Tam “is
clear that ‘[g]iving offense is a viewpoint’ when it comes to ethnic slurs.”23
Furthermore, a federal district court in Pennsylvania in April 2018 cited Tam’s lan-
guage that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint” in concluding that a ban on profanity and
vulgarity near an arena “likely constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”24 Additionally,
a federal district court in Texas in October 2017 held that removing an exhibit from the
Texas Capitol building because the exhibit’s “satirical tone rendered it offensive to
some portion of the population” represented viewpoint discrimination under Tam’s
logic.25 In other words, as Judge Sam Sparks put it, censoring speech because of its
“ostensibly mocking tone” equates to “viewpoint discrimination as a matter of law.”26
Tam and its early lower-court offspring raise an important question for First
Amendment jurisprudence: is censoring speech because it offends truly synonymous
with discriminating against a viewpoint, and therefore unconstitutional? Is it pos-
sible, in other words, for speech to offend without it taking sides—to use Justice
Kennedy’s words in Tam—on a particular “subject category”?27 That is the issue this
Article explores.
It is a vital question because offensiveness is instantiated today in several doc-
trines affecting First Amendment speech rights.28 For example, the Court’s three-
part test for obscenity adopted in Miller v. California29 measures obscenity partly
by whether content is “patently offensive.”30
Yet, this type of taking offense at viewing displays of sexual conduct does not
embody the dangers traditionally associated with viewpoint discrimination as the
Court has conceptualized it.31 Justice Antonin Scalia made this clear more than
23 Id. at 32 (quoting Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763) (alteration in original).
24 Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 322 F. Supp. 3d 558, 576 (M.D. Pa.
2018).
25 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Abbott, No. A-16-CA-00233-SS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 170183, at *16 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2017).
26 Id. at *18.
27 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766.
28 In addition to the obscenity doctrine discussed immediately below, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission’s test for indecency on the broadcast airwaves entails considering whether
the speech in question “depicts or describes sexual or excretory organs or activities in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast me-
dium.” In re WDBJ Television, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 30 F.C.C.R.
3024, 3027 (Mar. 23, 2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-32A1_Rcd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW3C-3D5W].
29 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that the trier of fact must examine whether: (a) the “‘aver-
age person, applying community standards’ would find the work . . . appeals to the ‘prurient
interest’”; (b) the work offensively depicts or describes sexual conduct; and (c) the work “lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
30 Id.
31 See infra note 39 and accompanying text (describing viewpoint discrimination as con-
ceptualized by the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995)).
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twenty-five years ago in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.32 He wrote that “[w]hen the basis
for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimi-
nation exists.”33 Scalia used obscenity—one of the few classes that is, in his words,
proscribable—to illustrate this point.34 He explained that “[a] State might choose to
prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience—i.e.,
that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not pro-
hibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages.”35
With this in mind, Part I of this Article uses two Supreme Court rulings to illus-
trate how offensiveness can exist independent of viewpoint discrimination. Next,
Part II analyzes a third Supreme Court ruling to demonstrate how some cases, in fact,
are hybrids in which offensiveness and viewpoint discrimination are inextricably
linked. Part III then returns to Tam to suggest how the justices might have avoided
conflating offensiveness with viewpoint discrimination. Finally, the Article concludes
in Part IV by calling on the Court to exercise what might be considered better doc-
trinal hygiene in cases such as Tam. That is especially imperative because the First
Amendment already “float[s] atop a tumultuous doctrinal sea.”36 The Conclusion
proposes two possible ways in which this might be done.
I. UNTANGLING DISTINCT DOCTRINES: THE COHEN AND PACIFICA FOUNDATION
EXAMPLES OF SEPARATING OFFENSIVE-SPEECH CASES FROM ONES
FOCUSING ON VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
Equating offensiveness with viewpoint discrimination in Tam—holding that of-
fensiveness and viewpoint discrimination are one in the same—and in subsequent
lower-court rulings unnecessarily blurs doctrinal lines. Specifically, the boundary is
now muddled between what traditionally might have been considered offensive-speech
cases—Cohen v. California37 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,38 most notably—and
viewpoint-discrimination cases in which the government targets “views taken by
speakers on a subject” because of “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker.”39
32 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
33 Id. at 388.
34 Id. The Supreme Court held more than sixty years ago that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) (writing that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press”).
35 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
36 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000).
37 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
38 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
39 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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In the former cases, this Article contends that offense is taken at how a message
is being expressed—the manner or mode in which it is conveyed. Censorship, in
turn, is impermissibly justified by the government in the interest of policing norms of
public morality and civility in how people communicate and interact with each other.40
A word such as “fuck” is censored in this scenario because its usage “is a cultural
taboo”41 in terms of how one should speak or talk, and thus it causes offense.42
Conversely, in the latter situation, discrimination is premised on the underlying
substantive position, opinion, or perspective that a message conveys.43 Censorship
in these scenarios is wrongly justified by the government deeming one substantive
position, opinion, or perspective more legitimate than another in the metaphorical
marketplace of ideas.44
Cohen v. California neatly illustrates the fundamental difference between these
perspectives.45 In Cohen, the Supreme Court threw out Paul Robert Cohen’s convic-
tion under a statute banning offensive conduct after he wore a jacket emblazoned
with the words “Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse.46
If Cohen had been analyzed by the Court as a case about viewpoint discrimina-
tion, then, per Justice Kennedy’s logic in Tam, the relevant subject matter would have
been the draft.47 California, in turn, would have engaged in viewpoint discrimination
if it punished only anti-draft messages like Cohen’s and permitted pro-draft ones. That
would be a classic instance of viewpoint discrimination; one in which the govern-
ment favors one substantive opinion or perspective on a single topic while restrain-
ing another.
It also would have been irrelevant under such a viewpoint-discrimination
framework that Cohen used the word “fuck.”48 Punishing him for “I object to the
draft” would have amounted to viewpoint discrimination just as much as punishing
40 This reflects former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post’s observation that First Amend-
ment cases since the 1940s, including Cohen v. California, have “generally served the purposes
of democracy by suspending the enforcement of civility rules.” ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 301 (1995).
41 Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1722 (2007).
42 Id. at 1722 n.72 (“Tabooed words are today known as obscene language, dirty words, four-
letter words . . . .” (quoting EDWARD SAGARIN, THE ANATOMY OF DIRTY WORDS 31 (1962))).
43 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., No. 17-35897, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
27581, at *10 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2018) (“[W]e conclude that Metro’s disparagement standard
discriminates, on its face, on the basis of viewpoint.”).
44 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The ‘market-
place of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition.”); Daniel
J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53
DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003) (“The marketplace of ideas locates the value of free speech in find-
ing the truth, and it makes the market the arbiter of truth or falsity.”).
45 See 403 U.S. 15, 16, 20, 22–23 (1971).
46 Id. at 16–17.
47 Id. at 16.
48 Id.
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him for “Fuck the Draft” provided that, in both scenarios, California would have
allowed Cohen to wear a jacket sporting “I support the draft.”49 In brief, it is taking
sides—not taking offense—about the merits of the draft that would have mattered
under a viewpoint-discrimination analysis in Cohen.
The Court, however, did not analyze Cohen as a viewpoint-discrimination case.50
Instead, it treated Cohen as an offensive-speech case. To wit, the central issue, after
determining that the speech was neither obscene51 nor likely to incite violence,52 was
whether “the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove
this offensive word from the public vocabulary.”53 In analyzing this issue, the Court
focused not on whether California was discriminating against Cohen’s substantive
anti-draft viewpoint. Rather, it focused on his manner of expression54 and concomi-
tant vagueness and line-drawing issues plaguing the concept of offensive expression
for which Cohen was convicted.55 As the Court wrote:
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? . . .
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is
49 Id. at 16, 18.
50 The Court in Cohen did observe, however, that censoring speech because words them-
selves cause offense could be used as a ruse to discriminate against viewpoints. Id. at 26. Spe-
cifically, it wrote that “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed,
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise
for banning the expression of unpopular views.” Id.
51 The Court explained that Cohen was:
[N]ot . . . an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise
to the States’ broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such ex-
pression must be, in some significant way, erotic. It cannot plausibly be
maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would
conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted
with Cohen’s crudely defaced jacket.
Id. at 20 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
52 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned:
We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are
standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. There may be
some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is
an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional
values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate
their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of expression.
Id. at 23.
53 Id. at 22–23.
54 See id. at 19 (noting that Cohen’s “conviction . . . rests squarely upon his exercise of the
‘freedom of speech’ . . . and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner
in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message
it conveys” (emphases added)).
55 Id. at 25.
836 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:829
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nev-
ertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.
Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.56
The Court also rebuffed the notion that California could censor the word “fuck”
simply to police norms of civil communication and maintain “a suitable level of
discourse within the body politic.”57 Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that
“[s]urely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.”58 Only if “substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner”59 can speech
be squelched “solely to protect others from hearing it.”60 Otherwise, the “emotive
function” of speech served by offensive words like Paul Robert Cohen’s must pre-
vail.61 The remedy for those who take offense in public places at messages such as
Cohen’s is simply to avert the eyes.62
Cohen’s dialectic between the cognitive and emotive functions of speech taps
into the difference between censoring speech because of its substantive viewpoint
(cognitive) and censoring speech because it causes emotional upheaval (emotive).63
In other words, while viewpoint-discrimination cases are about what substantive
idea is being said and censored, offensive-speech cases are about the emotional
impact (rather than the cognitive meaning) of speech.64 The latter is an insufficient
reason, standing alone, for squelching expression.65
In a nutshell, “fuck” is what offended in Cohen, not Cohen’s viewpoint about
conscription.66 “Fuck” is not a viewpoint. It is not even a viewpoint about sex. It is,
instead, a word that violates certain norms of civil discourse in polite society and
thus gives offense to some people by its very utterance. Justice Alito thus was wrong
56 Id.
57 Id. at 23.
58 Id. at 25.
59 Id. at 21.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 26.
62 Id. at 21.
63 The Court wrote that “much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative func-
tion: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force.” Id. at 26.
64 See id. at 18, 22.
65 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (observing the Court’s
“longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have
an adverse emotional impact on the audience”).
66 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18.
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in Tam when he flatly proclaimed, in oversimplistic fashion, that “[g]iving offense
is a viewpoint.”67 Perhaps better put, giving offense sometimes may be a viewpoint,68
but giving offense is not always a viewpoint.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation,69 which upheld the FCC’s power to censor indecent speech in broad-
casting, also illustrates the difference between offensive-speech cases and viewpoint-
discrimination cases.70 Pacifica Foundation, in brief, was an offensive-speech case.71
The Court framed the issue before it as “whether a broadcast of patently offensive
words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content.”72 The
FCC’s concern about George Carlin’s monologue regarding seven filthy words73 that
gave rise to the case was not about Carlin’s substantive viewpoint that society’s
attitudes to certain words were silly, but rather about “the way in which it [was] ex-
pressed.”74 Indeed, the Court observed that “[o]ur society has a tradition of perform-
ing certain bodily functions in private, and of severely limiting the public exposure
or discussion of such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are
offensive irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure.”75 The
Court added that:
If there were any reason to believe that the Commission’s char-
acterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced
to its political content—or even to the fact that it satirized con-
temporary attitudes about four-letter words—First Amendment
protection might be required. But that is simply not this case.76
Ultimately, the Court found that Carlin’s words were simply nuisances, unfit for
children to hear at times of day when they were likely to be in the broadcast audi-
ence.77 It was the danger of minors learning those offensive words—not any view-
point attached to them—that most concerned the Court.78 As the next Part briefly
67 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
68 See Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2331, 2335 (2018) (“Giving offense is a viewpoint if, and only if, the offense arises as a result
of the idea itself.”).
69 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
70 See id. at 745–46 (explaining that the FCC punished Carlin’s monologue simply because
it was patently offensive, not because of any viewpoint expressed by the monologue).
71 Id. at 746.
72 Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
73 Carlin’s filthy words were “shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.”
Id. at 751.
74 Id. at 746 n.22.
75 Id. at 746 n.23 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 746.
77 Id. at 749–51.
78 See id. at 749 (“[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young
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illustrates, however, there are some cases in which an offensive mode of expression
is inextricably intertwined with the substantive viewpoint expressed.
II. A HYBRID CASE ILLUSTRATING WHAT HAPPENS WHEN LINES BLUR:
TEXAS V. JOHNSON
The Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson,79 which upheld the right to burn the
American flag “as a means of political protest,”80 represents an instance of blurring
the lines between taking offense at the manner and mode of communication and
taking offense at the underlying substantive viewpoint. The Texas statute at issue
was designed to protect the American flag “against impairments that would cause
serious offense to others”81 and thus targeted “only those severe acts of physical
abuse of the flag carried out in a way likely to be offensive.”82 The statute was jus-
tified, Texas contended, to preserve “the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity.”83 Gregory Lee Johnson burned the flag as a means of protesting against
President Ronald Reagan and his policies, which Johnson viewed as unpatriotic.84
Johnson can be analyzed as either a viewpoint-discrimination case or as an
offensive-speech case. Johnson constitutes a viewpoint-discrimination case to the
extent that the defendant was punished for his negative views about the American
flag—views that conflicted with Texas’s positive position of the flag as a symbol
of national unity.85 As Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, Johnson argued:
[T]hat the State’s desire to maintain the flag as a symbol of nation-
hood and national unity assumes that there is only one proper
view of the flag. Thus, if Texas means to argue that its interest
does not prefer any viewpoint over another, it is mistaken; surely
one’s attitude toward the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.86
More simply put, if Johnson was punished because of his negative perspective toward
either the American flag or the policies of President Reagan that the flag supposedly
represented, then Johnson was an open-and-shut case of viewpoint discrimination.87
The topic or subject matter was either the American flag or Reagan’s policies, and
to read. Although Cohen’s written message might have been incomprehensible to a first grader,
Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”).
79 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
80 Id. at 399.
81 Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 413.
84 Id. at 406.
85 Id. at 412–13.
86 Id. at 413 n.9.
87 See id. at 416–17.
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the government of Texas, in turn, targeted only a subset of views—namely negative
ones—about those topics for punishment.88
Johnson can also be viewed as an offensive-speech case. That is because it also
was the manner or mode of Johnson’s expression of his negative views about the
American flag and Reagan’s policies that allegedly caused offense.89 In brief,
Johnson would not have been punished had he simply handed out flyers stating, “I
hate the American flag and everything it stands for, including President Reagan’s
policies.”90 He would not, in other words, have been prosecuted for those negative
opinions, perspectives, and viewpoints about either the American flag or Reagan’s
policies using a printed-word-only mode of expression. Instead, Johnson was pros-
ecuted because the manner and mode in which he conveyed his ideas—the act of
burning the American flag—allegedly causes offense.91 Viewed in this light, he was
punished because his method of communicating a negative message violated norms
of civil and proper discourse.
Ultimately, the Court in Johnson famously remarked that “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.”92 This captures well the hybrid nature of Johnson. It was Johnson’s
chosen mode of expressing (burning the American flag) an idea (disagreement with
the polices of the Reagan presidency and contempt for the flag as a symbol of na-
tional unity) that was so offensive and disagreeable.93 Johnson, in other words, cannot
be punished under the First Amendment for either of two reasons—because his manner
or mode of expressing a viewpoint offends some people or because the government
dislikes and disfavors his underlying substantive viewpoint.94 The First Amendment,
in a nutshell, protects both offensive modes of expression and disagreeable view-
points from government censorship.
III. DIGGING DEEPER INTO MATAL V. TAM
The problem in Matal v. Tam of equating giving offense with viewpoint discrim-
ination could have been avoided in two possible ways. First, the Court could have
treated the case as one of pure viewpoint discrimination. It could have done this by
focusing on the fact that the USPTO possessed power under federal law to deny
registration only to negative marks—but not positive ones—about individuals.95 To




92 Id. at 414.
93 Id. at 411.
94 See id. at 414, 416.
95 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755 (2017).
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take this tack, the Court simply would have interpreted the meaning of the key statu-
tory word “disparage”96 more consistently with its dictionary definition. Disparage
means “[to] speak slightingly about,” and synonyms include “[to] belittle” and “[to]
denigrate.”97 This definition is not identical to that of the word offensive.98 Antonyms
for disparage, in turn, are “[to] applaud” and “[to] laud.”99
The statutory clause at issue in Tam that allowed the USPTO to deny registration
to marks that “may disparage . . . persons”100 thus simply could have been interpreted
to mean that the USPTO could deny registration to marks that are negative about
individuals, while allowing them to register marks that are positive about those same
people. In fact, Justice Alito hinted at such an approach when he called the dispar-
agement provision “a happy-talk clause.”101 He noted that it “applies to trademarks
like the following: ‘Down with racists,’ ‘Down with sexists,’ ‘Down with homo-
phobes.’”102 Not one of those examples is offensive in terms of the manner or mode
in which it is phrased. Instead, each is simply a negative statement about a group of
individuals, rather than an opposing positive one, such as “Up with racists.”103 Put
differently and in the factual context of Tam, the Court could have focused on the fact
that the disparagement clause applied to “Down with Asians” but not to “Up with
Asians,” thereby providing a tidy way of analyzing Tam as an unadulterated case of
viewpoint discrimination. It would have allowed the Court not to conflate its offensive-
speech jurisprudence with its principles against viewpoint discrimination.
An alternative approach for analyzing Tam would simply have been to address
it as an offensive-speech case. The Court could have focused on the word “slants”
and, in turn, reasoned that the USPTO cannot deny registration to that word simply
because it violates norms of civil conversation in identifying or describing Asians.104
In this sense, the use of “slants” offends, much like the word “fuck,” as a type of
cultural taboo.105 Under this path, the Court could have viewed the USPTO’s use of
the disparagement clause as an impermissible tool or weapon to cleanse discourse
by removing from what the Court in Cohen called “distasteful” speech.106
96 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
97 Disparage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disparage
[https://perma.cc/A89T-3ABS].
98 Offensive remarks are ones that “caus[e] displeasure or resentment” or “caus[e] someone
to feel hurt, angry, or upset.” Offensive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/offensive [https://perma.cc/98VF-VDCD].
99 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 97.
100 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
101 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
102 Id.
103 See id. at 1754.
104 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
105 Fairman, supra note 41, at 1722.
106 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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CONCLUSION
Before the Supreme Court’s observation in Matal v. Tam that “[g]iving offense
is a viewpoint” becomes deeply entrenched in First Amendment jurisprudence and
widely embraced by lower courts, it is important to understand that giving offense
is not synonymous with viewpoint discrimination. As this Article illustrated, both
Cohen v. California and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation demonstrate that offense may
exist independently from viewpoint discrimination.107
Tam, in essence, equated offensive name-calling with viewpoint discrimina-
tion.108 For full-throated free speech advocates, that certainly was wonderful news,
reinforcing the notion that what some might consider to be hate speech is protected
by the First Amendment.109 Tam, however, conflated the general rule from cases
such as Cohen—that speech cannot be censored merely because it offends—with the
principle that the government cannot favor one viewpoint over another in debate on
any substantive topic or subject matter.110 Although the Court in Tam reached the
correct conclusion that the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech,111 it easily could have arrived at that same result, as de-
scribed in Part III, by taking either one of two separate paths. Specifically, it could
have held that the government cannot ban phrases like “The Slants” because they
offend—as a taboo manner of speaking about a group of people—norms of civility.
Alternatively, it could have resolved—as an instance of viewpoint discrimination—that
the government cannot permit only laudatory, celebratory, or positive viewpoints
about a group of people, e.g., “Asians rock!”, while banning derogatory, critical or
negative viewpoints about that same group, e.g., “Asians suck!”
Perhaps one way to untangle the difference in the future is for the Court initially
to ask whether it is how a message is being expressed—the manner or mode of
expression, such as whether it involves “taboo language”—to which offense is taken
as “a reaction to the word”—in question—or whether it is a substantive perspective
about an idea, person, or group of persons that is the primary reason for it being caught
in the cross-hairs of censorship. If this were the threshold question of analysis in a
107 See supra Part I (analyzing both Cohen and Pacifica Foundation).
108 See supra Introduction, Part I.
109 As Justice Alito explained in Tam, “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the
thought that we hate.’” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States
v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). See Leslie Kendrick, The
Answers and the Questions in First Amendment Law, in CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE
LEGACY OF RACE AND INEQUITY 70 (Louis P. Nelson & Claudrena N. Harold eds., 2018)
(observing that “[i]n America, hate speech is not a legal category”).
110 See supra Introduction, Part I.
111 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
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case like Tam, then the Court could take a cleaner approach in its examination that
does not unnecessarily blend different doctrines.
In other words, in a case such as Cohen v. California,112 the Court would start
by asking whether it is the mere use of the word “fuck” in an anti-draft message that
is the primary reason for censorship, or whether it is the underlying perspective
about the draft that triggers censorship.113 Only in cases where the primary reason for
censorship is not clear as between these two paths should the Court then proceed to
analyze them under both approaches. In analyzing such cases under both tacks,
however, the Court should nonetheless keep separate its two analyses rather than
entangling them.
A second possible way to keep offensive-speech cases largely separate from
viewpoint-discrimination principles is to deploy the Court’s dichotomy in Cohen
between the emotive and cognitive functions of speech.114 Under this methodology,
if the primary reason for censorship is to protect individuals from the emotional pain
and anguish caused by hearing a particular word or phrase, then the case is better ana-
lyzed as an offensive-speech case. Conversely, if the primary reason for censorship
is to protect individuals from hearing a substantive viewpoint or perspective—
something other than just name-calling—because it may cause them to think differently
about a particular issue or to take a different course of action than they would without
hearing it, then the case is better addressed as one of viewpoint discrimination.
Neither proposal may work in all situations and, as Part II suggested, there may
be some cases, such as Texas v. Johnson, where offensive speech and viewpoint
discrimination are seemingly inextricably knotted.115 Both suggestions, however, may
help the Court to distinguish better between two doctrinal strands of First Amendment
jurisprudence that were muddled in Matal v. Tam.
112 See supra Part I (addressing Cohen).
113 See supra Part I.
114 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
115 See supra Part II.
